A report making a meticulous dissection of the timeline for the Lahaina fire disaster of Aug. 8 has been released by Hawaii’s attorney general, documenting the events of that tragic day and night. Developed from a comprehensive investigation by the Fire Safety Research Institute, it holds great value for Maui County and the entire state in detailing particulars of the fire’s spread, with its deadly consequences, and of the county’s haphazard response.
This state-funded report, the first of three, will be followed by an analysis of state and county disaster/emergency policies and procedures in a second phase, due in late summer; and finally by recommendations for improvements in Hawaii’s wildfire safety planning, by year’s end.
The full breadth of the reports’ findings, urgently needed, must be acted upon as soon as possible — because while this preliminary accounting doesn’t draw conclusions about the efficacy of the response, facts presented show clearly that Maui was ill-prepared for the fast- moving fire. Weather factors aside, top officials could have done much, much more.
Emergency responders in the field were not informed, directed or equipped adequately to meet the daunting challenges of a wind-fanned Lahaina blaze that developed into an out-of-control “urban conflagration,” which quickly grew to consume thousands of structures and took 101 lives. Officials responsible for leading the emergency response were essentially inactive and inadequate to the task. The failures of leadership and preparation that led to this horrifying juncture must be acknowledged and urgently rectified to avoid placing more lives at risk going forward.
To be prepared for a disaster, counties must plan for worst-case scenarios. Yet tragically, it’s clear that this kind of planning and preparation was not in place, even though it should have been acted upon long before Aug. 8. Particularly by the very agency tasked with this: the Maui Emergency Management Agency (MEMA).
Key points of the timeline: A fast-moving brush fire mauka of Lahaina ignited early in the morning. Though difficult to suppress, hard- working firefighters believed it was finally extinguished at 2:17 p.m. But at 2:55 p.m., a fire was reported in the same location, and with winds quickening, spread downhill, jumping roads and reaching homes.
Hundreds of 911 calls began pouring in. But communications between MEMA, police and fire departments and the mayor remained dismally minimal. MEMA’s chief, Herman Andaya, was in Honolulu, receiving text updates from his administrative aassistant at Maui’s emergency operations center (EOC).
The conflagration “overwhelmed the town’s limited evacuation routes, some blocked by downed utility poles and electrical lines.” Amid confusion over whether electric lines were energized and potentially deadly themselves or had been deactivated, and which roads were open or closed, the report states, “Many residents found themselves trapped.”
Residents and responders acted on the fly to open up escape routes, pulling down locked gates or clearing obstructions, but in some cases, conditions were dire. On Kahua Street, part of a former sugar mill community with narrow roads and tightly packed homes, the roadway became blocked, and many residents were unable to escape. More than 40 of the fire-related deaths in Lahaina were concentrated here.
The meltdown of phone lines and cellular structures complicated matters. Maui’s police and fire departments used radio channels that were private to them. Emergency dispatchers being slammed with calls knew people were being trapped, or were desperately seeking evacuation instructions, but this information didn’t reach the public for hours.
As communications faltered, and responders became overwhelmed, MEMA’s response throughout was completely inadequate. The agency is charged with “coordinating emergency management operations in meeting disaster situations” — yet this was not done. Its failure to establish clear lines of authority and assist with communications is shocking.
Note this exchange at 3:15 p.m., when Andaya’s aide at the EOC, Gaye Gabuat, texted him, “New fire in Lahaina next to the Intermediate School.” A minute later, Andaya replied “oh boy,” which caused Gabuat to reply that the fire is “approaching houses per chief.”
At 3:50 p.m., Maui Mayor Richard Bissen’s communications director texted Andaya: “pretty chaotic right now for mfd and mpd.” That still was not enough for MEMA to sound the alarm for outside help. In fact, at 3:53 p.m. Gabuat texted Andaya, “lol chief looks so overwhelm.” The next message to Andaya from Gabuat read, “Chief is wanting help from the military. Not sure of what.”
Unbelievable.
Each county’s disaster-planning and -response teams must study this response timeline and the state’s forthcoming reports to ensure that preparation and training on each island is sharpened. Each plan must not fail to include communication protocols during emergencies, lines of authority and expectations for cross-agency cooperation.
“Adequacy of warning systems, evacuation planning and the preparedness of communities for such extreme fire events” have been called into question by the AG’s report. Now, ensuring these aspects of emergency response must be a statewide priority.