Hawaii’s U.S. Rep. Ed Case and others are promoting a bill in Congress, the “BLUE Pacific Act,” calling for a large increase in U.S. “engagement” with the various islands of the Pacific (“Case reintroduces bill for more engagement,” Star Advertiser, July 14). Of course, we know only too well that “engagement” is a slippery term liable to have many meanings. Between true partners, it can imply mutual support in a relationship of real equity and partnership, but there is also the potential for it to be a cover for tight-fisted influence and exploitation by the stronger party.

This is crucial here because Case bases his sense of “engagement” on the notion that Pacific entities have long shared positive “ties” with the U.S., insisting that its basis lies in “the common values shared between our country and the Pacific Islands.” So we need to question the nature of those “ties” and “values.”

Around 1900, the United States was emerging victorious from the Spanish-American War and expanding its power into the Central Pacific. Military force was used to overthrow the independent kingdom of Hawaii. The islands were promptly incorporated into the U.S. with nary a voice from Native Hawaiians about the matter. At the same time, Guam and parts of Micronesia were being incorporated into the U.S.’s expanding oceanic empire. Locals living in these islands were denied the opportunity to vote on this.

And the Filipinos: They had valiantly fought for years for independence from Spain and were on the point of success when U.S. troops violently intervened and forcibly turned the Philippines into an American colony. Guam, Hawaii and the Philippines were then organized as heavily militarized bastions of U.S. power in the Pacific.

So it was natural, in 1941, for these U.S. bases to come under attack from Japan, a rival empire, in search of mastery of the Pacific. And even after formal independence in 1946, the Philippines continued to host important military bases, to be closely tied to the U.S. economy, while the U.S. gave firm support to a dictator like Ferdinand Marcos.

Yet, all this history is ignored in the BLUE Pacific Act.

Actually, the real objectives of this bill are fairly transparent — especially at a time of heightened tensions in this area between a resurgent China and the United States for oceanic (and more likely, global) supremacy. In fact, the South China Sea, where the Xi regime is challenging the traditional domination of the U.S. and its allies, has emerged as a serious tinderbox of war.

In their BLUE Pacific bill, Case and his congressional allies emphasize benefits like “development” and “trade” for the islands. Well and good, perhaps. But “security” also gets mentioned and is clearly at the root of things. The aim here is to prevent Chinese influence from growing and to retain the longtime U.S. position in “the Pacific Lake.” Note that when Congress previously rejected the BLUE Pacific Act, the bill’s multimillion-dollar “gifts” got folded into another act with the revealing title, the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act.

Yes, we should be strongly critical of an oppressive Chinese dictatorship (and support Taiwan’s independence). But isn’t a realistic — and safer — policy for us in the nuclear age to acknowledge that the post-World War II era of U.S. hegemony in the Pacific is over and that China’s role in the Pacific will continue to expand? We note that recently the Chinese have even made initial contacts with islands such as the Solomons and Kiribati, which they had previously had scant interest in.

Noel Kent is professor emeritus of ethnic studies at the University of Hawaii-Manoa.