The People’s Republic of China just launched its third aircraft carrier in a decade, the CNS Fujian, on June 17. More importantly, it is China’s first catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) carrier, giving it far greater capability than its ski-jump predecessors.
Although Fujian is two to three years from becoming fully operational and its design is not as capable as America’s Nimitz-class carriers, its launch reflects a troubling trend in the Indo-Pacific maritime power balance. Many analysts have noted that China has now launched three carriers and brought two into full operational status during a decade, where the U.S. Navy has struggled to bring one new unit to full operational status. Most analysts expect two or more Fujian-class carriers to enter service by 2030.
The Fujian constitutes a major milestone in China’s growing naval power. Catapult-launched planes can carry a heavier fuel and ordnance load than those launched vertically or via ski jump. Also, CATOBAR carrier air wings can include Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), logistics and tanker aircraft, greatly expanding its battlespace management capabilities, at-sea serviceability, and air wing strike range, respectively.
Those and other capabiities show how much China’s shipbuilding industry and navy have advanced technologically over the last 20 years.
Today’s aircraft carriers represent the ultimate amalgamation of aircraft, sensor, ship and weapons technology; and human resources. Only the most highly developed aviation and maritime industries can build and equip them. Their construction requires the integration of ship and aviation technology, making it essential to look beyond the carrier itself to the potential air wing’s components when judging a nation’s carrier force.
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China’s ski-jump carriers rely on helicopters or shore-based AWACS to provide airborne early warning and tactical fighters carrying refueling kits, called “buddy stores,” to tank their fighters; that limits the carrier’s low-level detection and tracking range and cuts the 25-fighter air wing’s punch. The Fujian and its later sisters will change that.
Its displacement and air wing size will approximate that of the U.S. Navy’s 80,000-ton Kitty Hawk class, giving it an air wing of about 50 fighters and about 10-20 supporting aircraft. That air wing will not only be larger than those of China’s earlier carriers, but its aircraft will be more capable.
Fujian’s fighter wing will include the fifth-generation J-31, a stealth aircraft that has entered final development, with production expected to start by late 2023. China also has a carrier-capable AWACS in advanced testing, which reputedly has an advanced active electronically scanned array radar.
Finally, there is the human element. Integrating the ship’s crew and embarked air wing personnel is critical to ensuring the safe and effective employment of the carrier’s primary weapons system, its aircraft. The carrier must then be fused into task group and then fleet operations to reach its full potential. China has built a cadre of personnel experienced in carrier operations. It is honing a fleet doctrine that may include coordinated operations with the Strategic Rocket Force’s antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) units. The ABSM- carrier combination will add another dimension to China’s maritime capabilities and reinforce its area/sea denial strategy.
Thus, Fujian’s launch last month is but one component of the challenging maritime future the U.S. Navy faces. Looking beyond carriers, China is commissioning almost two high-technology guided missile destroyers or frigates annually, at a time the U.S. Navy is struggling to maintain its shrinking fleet of aging surface combatants with no operational viable replacements under construction.
For the foreseeable future, the U.S. Navy’s only advantage lies in its submarine force and larger, more-capable sea-based air power. However, the U.S. is losing its overall technological advantage. Only time will tell if the U.S. Navy can regain that edge and recover from its past missteps in time to address the strategic situation. America must invest in that now or pay very heavily for its failure later.
Honolulu resident Carl O. Schuster is a retired Navy captain and former director of operations at U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center.