As we commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Dec. 7 attack on PearlHarbor and remember the horrific war that followed, we must continue to look forward to preserve the policies and force postures that have provided stability and promoted U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific in recent decades. If campaign rhetoric is to be believed, some practices may be at risk. But, experience tells us to discount at least half of what is said during presidential campaigns; the challenge is predicting correctly which half to discount.

In truth, it’s still anyone’s guess what the Trump administration’s Asia policy will be. But in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, consistency is most likely to prevail.

President Barack Obama’s “pivot” toward Asia will likely exit when he does. Still, the centrality of U.S. alliances has been a bipartisan constant since the end of WWII and America’s focus on Asia as a national security priority has enjoyed bipartisan support since the end of the Cold War.

President-elect Donald Trump’s assurances to South Korean President Park Geun-hye that he was committed to a “strong, firm” alliance and that America would be with Korea “until the end” provide the first strong indication that our Asia alliances and commitments will continue. Also encouraging was Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s post-dinner comments that “Mr. Trump is a leader in whom I can have great confidence.”

Another bipartisan constant has been America’s firm commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. While candidate Trump seemed cavalier about nuclear weapons — “If Japan had that nuclear threat, I’m not sure that would be a bad thing for us” — he has since tweeted that “@nytimes states today that DJT believes ‘more countries should acquire nuclear weapons.’ How dishonest are they. I never said this!” True, he never said those exact words, but the implication was there.

However, a Trump adviser (unnamed) recently commented that Trump has reportedly “moved on to talk about non-proliferation in a way that you would hear from any Republican president,” and further noted that “We are very much committed to both non-proliferation and assuring the allies that not only will they continue to be under the nuclear umbrella, but that we are going to be strengthening our missile defense in ways that alleviate some of their concerns about North Korea.”

If this is Trump’s real view — and it certainly should be — one hopes that he will say these words himself, and sooner rather than later.

One area where Trump has been clear — and in this author’s opinion, clearly wrong — has been in rejecting President Obama’s signature multilateral trade deal, the Trans Pacific Partnership: “On trade, I’m going to issue a notification of intent to withdraw from the TPP … . Instead we will negotiate fair bilateral trade deals that bring jobs and industry back onto America shores.”

Trump has argued that he is not against free trade, only “bad” deals.

If he is prepared to pursue a bilateral agreement with the largest TPP partner — Japan — that can help repair some of the damage caused by his intended abrogation of American international trade leadership, at some point he needs to readdress the multilateral agreement (just as Presidents Bill Clinton and Obama learned to live with NAFTA, after both campaigned against it).

Other than walking away from TPP, which includes four members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Southeast Asia was not an issue in the presidential campaign.

As a result, reaffirming America’s commitment to ASEAN’s centrality in promoting constructive multilateral security cooperation should be easy (but should not be overlooked).

Relations with the individual ASEAN members is potentially more contentious. One of the Obama administration’s biggest successes has been its constructive engagement with Myanmar; this has to be sustained.

Dealing with the Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte may prove trickier, given their respective temperaments. Trump should be sympathetic toward Duterte’s goal of eradicating the Philippines drug problem, but he needs also to reiterate America’s commitment to due process and the rule of law.

Almost as important as having the correct policies is having personnel who can best explain and implement them.

Trump’s choice as secretary of state will send a clear and important message. Should he pick a more ideological conservative, it could send a (wrong) signal that America’s constructive engagement with China is being replaced by a counterproductive containment approach. Someone with some diplomatic experience — former U.S. Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman immediately comes to mind — would be much more reassuring.

Pearl Harbor taught us the need to remain engaged and prepared in Asia. The region continues to grow in importance to the U.S., politically, economically and strategically.

Clarity regarding the new administration’s policy toward Asia is critical and must be presented without delay as we remember the sacrifices of those who have given us the peace we currently enjoy.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies).