North Korea’s nuclear policy seems based on a simple, but fatally flawed, premise; namely that its quest to put a nuclear warhead on an intercontinental missile and launch it at the United States will somehow ensure the security of the nation and regime. Nothing could be further from the truth! The closer Pyongyang gets to achieving this capability, the greater becomes the cost of allowing it to do this.

For decades now, U.S. military forces have been deterred from attacking North Korea, not because of any embryonic nuclear weapons capability but because of the destruction the North’s conventionally-armed weapons could rain on Seoul; the costs associated with pursuing a military solution outweighed the costs of tolerating the North’s existence.

But this calculus is changing. The cost of doing nothing and thus allowing Pyongyang to fully develop the ability to put a nuclear weapon on Seoul, Tokyo or the U.S. proper will soon outweigh the costs associated with the use of military force. At that point, the use of force becomes a viable, if not inevitable option.

Such an option still incurs great risk. Therefore, a policy of regime change by other than military means may be tried first. Previous U.S. efforts have sought to change regime behavior, “to bring North Korea to its senses, not to its knees,” as Adm. Harry Harris, head of U.S. Pacific Command, testified before Congress last week. This may soon change. An all-out effort to destabilize the Kim regime is likely coming, and China might go along with the idea. It’s already clear that Xi Jinping is not Kim Jong-Un’s biggest fan.

Don’t get me wrong. Pursuing regime change, regardless of how it’s done, is a terrible option. But if Pyongyang continues on its current path, military planners may view it as the only viable alternative. Adding missile defenses, as Adm. Harris testified, may help but cannot assure security.

There is a way out, however. Pyongyang has long desired a peace treaty with Washington but has failed to recognize that the road to Washington runs through Seoul. There will soon be a new South Korean leader who may be more ready to do business with the North, but he will still need Kim Jong-Un to meet him halfway.

North Korea’s founder (the current leader’s grandfather) Kim Il-Sung once proposed a Koryo Federation comprising two independent Korean states that respected each other’s choice of political systems. Once the people of the South have democratically selected their new leader, Kim Jong-Un should send him a letter, addressed to the President of the Republic of Korea (rather than the usual “leader of south Korea” salutation) and propose a meeting to discuss “peaceful coexistence” as a first step toward a harmonious, denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

Then, send a note to Chinese President Xi asking him to reconvene the long-moribund Six-Party Talks on the basis of the Sept. 19, 2005, Joint Agreement’s “action-for-action” agenda and signal to Washington that Pyongyang is open to the “grand bargain” previously suggested by the Pacific Forum’s founder, Rear Adm. Lloyd “Joe” Vasey (USN, ret.), which calls for a mini-Marshall Plan and security guarantees for North Korea in return for verifiable denuclearization.

Or, Pyongyang can continue on the present, potentially self-destructive path, leaving the Trump administration with only two options: accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state capable of holding Seoul, Tokyo, Honolulu and eventually Washington at risk; or taking whatever steps are necessary to prevent the North from reaching this goal. All options are on the table; the choice, at least initially, is Pyongyang’s.